NARCISISMO DO CEO E GERENCIAMENTO POR ATIVIDADES REAIS
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.51320/rmc.v26i1.1637Palabras clave:
Narcisismo, Chief Executive Officer, Gerenciamento de resultado por atividades reaisResumen
Resumen
Este estudio tiene como objetivo analizar la influencia de los CEOs narcisistas en la gestión de resultados a través de actividades reales. Utilizando una muestra de 543 observaciones de empresas cotizadas, el narcisismo se captura a través de las declaraciones de los CEOs en teleconferencias, y la gestión de resultados se mide utilizando los tres modelos de Roychowdhury (2006). Los resultados muestran que los CEOs altamente narcisistas, cuando forman parte del consejo de administración, tienden a involucrarse en la gestión de resultados a través del flujo de caja y los gastos discrecionales. También se encontró que la gestión basada en devengos se considera un sustituto de la gestión de actividades reales. Además, durante las recesiones económicas, la gestión de resultados a través del flujo de caja operativo disminuye, mientras que los gastos discrecionales aumentan. Este estudio ayuda a las empresas a ejercer una mayor cautela en la contratación e implementación de mecanismos de gobernanza para mitigar el comportamiento potencialmente poco ético.
Palabras clave: Narcisismo; Director Ejecutivo; Gestión de resultados mediante actividades reales
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Derechos de autor 2025 Niara Gonçalves da Cruz, Renata Turola Takamatsu, Fernanda Alves Cordeiro
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