NARCISISMO DO CEO E GERENCIAMENTO POR ATIVIDADES REAIS

Autores

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.51320/rmc.v26i1.1637

Palavras-chave:

Narcisismo, Chief Executive Officer, Gerenciamento de resultado por atividades reais

Resumo

O trabalho tem como objetivo examinar a influência dos CEOs narcisistas no gerenciamento de resultados real. Este estudo preenche uma lacuna na literatura ao verificar a interação entre o narcisismo do CEO e a moderação do conselho de administração sobre o gerenciamento de resultados reais. Com uma amostra de 111 empresas listadas na B3, o narcisismo é medido pela proporção de pronomes possessivos e pessoais da primeira pessoa do singular em relação ao total de pronomes da primeira pessoa nas falas dos CEOs durante as teleconferências. O gerenciamento de resultados é avaliado com base nos três modelos de Roychowdhury (2006). Para testar as hipóteses foi utilizada a modelagem de dados em painel Mínimos Quadrados Generalizados (GLS) com correção de heterocedasticidade e autocorrelação. Os resultados evidenciam que CEOs com alto nível de narcisismo, quando participam do conselho de administração, tendem a realizar o gerenciamento de resultados por meio do fluxo de caixa e de despesas discricionárias. Também foi encontrado que o gerenciamento por accruals é considerado um substituto para o gerenciamento real. Ademais, observou-se que, em períodos de recessão econômica, os níveis de gerenciamento de resultados se tornam menores para as manipulações pelo padrão de fluxo de caixa operacional e maiores para as despesas discricionárias. Este estudo auxilia as companhias a terem maior cautela em relação a contratação e implementação de mecanismos de governança que mitiguem possíveis atitudes antiéticas.

 

Downloads

Não há dados estatísticos.

Referências

Alhmood, M. A., Shaari, H., & Al-dhamari, R. (2020). CEO Characteristics and Real Earnings Management in Jordan. International Journal of Financial Research, 11(4), 255.

Almeida-Santos, P. S., Verhagem, J. A., & Bezerra, F. A. (2011). Gerenciamento de resultados por meio de decisoes operacionais e a governança corporativa: analise das industrias siderurgicas e metalurgicas brasileiras. Revista de Contabilidade e Organizações, 5(13).

American Psychiatric Association. (1994). DSM-IV: Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. JAMA: The Journal of the American Medical Association, 272(10), 828.

American Psychiatric Association. (2001). The character of self-enhancers: Implications for organizations. In Personality psychology in the workplace. (pp. 193–219). American Psychological Association. https://doi.org/10.1037/10434-008

Amernic, J. H., & Craig, R. J. (2010). Accounting as a Facilitator of Extreme Narcissism. Journal of Business Ethics, 96(1), 79–93.

Capalbo, F., Frino, A., Lim, M. Y., Mollica, V., & Palumbo, R. (2018). The Impact of CEO Narcissism on Earnings Management. Abacus, 54(2), 210–226.

Cruz, N. G., Takamatsu, R. T., & Cordeiro, F. A. (2024). Narcissism and Earnings Management. Review of Business Management, 26(02). https://doi.org/10.7819/rbgn.v26i02.4260

Chatterjee, A., & Hambrick, D. C. (2007). It’s All about Me: Narcissistic Chief Executive Officers and Their Effects on Company Strategy and Performance. Administrative Science Quarterly, 52(3), 351–386. https://doi.org/10.2189/asqu.52.3.351

Collins, D. W., Pungaliya, R. S., & Vijh, A. M. (2017). The Effects of Firm Growth and Model Specification Choices on Tests of Earnings Management in Quarterly Settings. The Accounting Review, 92(2), 69–100. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr-51551

Craig, R. ., & Amernic, J. . (2004). Enron discourse: the rhetoric of a resilient capitalism. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 15(6–7), 813–852.

Cressey, D. (1953). Other people’s Money: A study of the social psychology of embezzlement. Free Press.

Daily, C. M., & Dalton, D. R. (1997). CEO and Board Chair Roles Held Jointly or Separately: Much Ado About Nothing? Academy of Management Perspectives, 11(3), 11–20.

Finkelstein, S. (1992). POWER IN TOP MANAGEMENT TEAMS: DIMENSIONS, MEASUREMENT, AND VALIDATION. Academy of Management Journal, 35(3), 505–538. https://doi.org/10.2307/256485

Finkelstein, S., & D’Aveni, R. A. (1994). ceo duality as a double-edged sword: how boards of directors balance entrenchment avoidance and unity of command. Academy of Management Journal, 37(5), 1079–1108.

Freitas, M. R. D. O., Pereiras, G. M., Vasconcelos, A. C. De, & Luca, M. M. M. De. (2020). Concentração Acionária, Conselho de Administração e Remuneração de Executivos. Revista de Administração de Empresas, 60(5), 322–335.

Gounopoulos, D., & Pham, H. (2018). Financial Expert CEOs and Earnings Management Around Initial Public Offerings. The International Journal of Accounting, 53(2), 102–117.

Graham, J. R., Harvey, C. R., & Rajgopal, S. (2005). The economic implications of corporate financial reporting. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 40(1–3), 3–73.

Instituto Brasileiro de Governança Corporativa (IBGC). (2009). Código das melhores práticas de governança corporativa (4th ed.).

Ipino, E., & Parbonetti, A. (2017). Mandatory IFRS adoption: the trade-off between accrual-based and real earnings management. Accounting and Business Research, 47(1), 91–121.

Jasman, J., & Murwaningsari, E. (2018). The roles of internal audit quality on the relationship between narcissistic CEOs and real earnings management. Journal of Business & Retail Management Research, 13(01).

Jenkins, D. S., Kane, G. D., & Velury, U. (2009). Earnings Conservatism and Value Relevance Across the Business Cycle. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 36(9–10), 1041–1058. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5957.2009.02164.x

Judge, T. A., Piccolo, R. F., & Kosalka, T. (2009). The bright and dark sides of leader traits: A review and theoretical extension of the leader trait paradigm. The Leadership Quarterly, 20(6), 855–875.

Júnior Mellone, G., & Saito, R. (2004). Monitoramento interno e desempenho da empresa: determinantes de substituição de executivos em empresas de capital aberto no Brasil. R.Adm, 39(4), 385–397.

Kang, S.-A., & Kim, Y.-S. (2012). Effect of corporate governance on real activity-based earnings management: evidence from Korea/Imoniu valdymo poveikis, pagristas darbo uzmokescio valdymu: Korejos pavyzdys. Journal of Business Economics and Management, 13(1), 29–52. https://doi.org/10.3846/16111699.2011.620164

Kothari, S. P., Mizik, N., & Roychowdhury, S. (2015). Managing for the Moment: The Role of Earnings Management via Real Activities versus Accruals in SEO Valuation. The Accounting Review, 91(2), 559–586.

Lin, F., Lin, S.-W., & Fang, W.-C. (2020). How CEO narcissism affects earnings management behaviors. The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, 51, 101080.

Masulis, R. W., Wang, C., & Xie, F. (2012). Globalizing the boardroom—The effects of foreign directors on corporate governance and firm performance. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 53(3), 527–554.

McNulty, T., & Pettigrew, A. (1999). Strategists on the Board. Organization Studies, 20(1), 47–74. https://doi.org/10.1177/0170840699201003

Murphy, P. R. (2012). Attitude, Machiavellianism and the rationalization of misreporting. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 37(4), 242–259.

Nuanpradit, S. (2019). Real earnings management in Thailand: CEO duality and serviced early years. Asia-Pacific Journal of Business Administration, 11(1), 88–108.

Olsen, K. J., Dworkis, K. K., & Young, S. M. (2014). CEO Narcissism and Accounting: A Picture of Profits. Journal of Management Accounting Research, 26(2), 243–267.

Peasnell, K. V., Pope, P. F., & Young, S. (2005). Board Monitoring and Earnings Management: Do Outside Directors Influence Abnormal Accruals? Journal of Business Finance, 32(7–8), 1311–1346.

Phillips, E. M. (2019). An Examination Of Narcissistic And Non_Narcissistic CEO’s Financial Reporting Behavior During Times Of Market Euphoria And Crashe. The University of Arizona.

Raskin, R., & Terry, H. (1988). A principal-components analysis of the Narcissistic Personality Inventory and further evidence of its construct validity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54(5), 890–902.

Rhodewalt, F., & Morf, C. C. (1995). Self and Interpersonal Correlates of the Narcissistic Personality Inventory: A Review and New Findings. Journal of Research in Personality, 29(1), 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1006/jrpe.1995.1001

Roychowdhury, S. (2006). Earnings management through real activities manipulation. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 42(3), 335–370.

Sun, J., Lan, G., & Liu, G. (2014). Independent audit committee characteristics and real earnings management. Managerial Auditing Journal, 29(2), 153–172.

Talbi, D., Omri, M. A., Guesmi, K., & Ftiti, Z. (2015). The Role Of Board Characteristics In Mitigating Management Opportunism: The Case Of Real Earnings Management. Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR), 31(2), 661.

Watts, R. L., & Zimmerman, J. L. (1985). Positive Accounting Theory (1st ed.). Pearson.

Zang, A. Y. (2012). Evidence on the Trade-Off between Real Activities Manipulation and Accrual-Based Earnings Management. The Accounting Review, 87(2), 675–703.

Publicado

2025-05-16

Como Citar

Gonçalves da Cruz, N., Turola Takamatsu, R., & ALVES CORDEIRO, F. (2025). NARCISISMO DO CEO E GERENCIAMENTO POR ATIVIDADES REAIS. Revista Mineira De Contabilidade, 26(1), 93–107. https://doi.org/10.51320/rmc.v26i1.1637

Edição

Seção

Artigos científicos: